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Abstract
This work studies a multidimensional auction in which a buyer needs
to procure a given good from either of two potential suppliers with het-
erogeneous costs and whose qualities are the buyer’s private information.
Comparing the outcomes of different procurement policies, a trade-off be-
tween efficiency and rent-extraction emerges. Buyer’s expected utility is
maximized via a first score auction and either concealing or privately re-
vealing suppliers’ quality - the optimal choice depending on the degree of
heterogeneity in costs and qualities. Conversely, efficiency calls for a second
score auction or a first score auction with public disclosure of qualities.
1 Introduction
In procurement auctions buyers are frequently interested not only in minimizing
the price, but also in obtaining the maximum “value for money”. This value may
depend on the quality associated to the proposed product, and/or the intrinsic
characteristics of each supplier. Multidimensional auction models usually assume
that the quality associated with each bid is ex-ante known by the respective bidder.
Quality is therefore generally represented as an objective factor that can be either
exogenous or endogenously determined as part of the bidding process. In many
procurement settings however, a sort of horizontal differentiation exists, in the
sense that buyers subjectively assess the quality of different goods according to
their individual requirements or tastes. In this context quality can be regarded as
a measure of how much the good fits the need of the buyer, and the procurer holds
private information about such aspect of the alternative suppliers, while bidders
can only guess how their quality will be evaluated.
In this paper we analyze some of the interesting questions associated with pro-
curement auctions in the presence of horizontally differentiated suppliers: should
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the auctioneer reveal information about the quality of suppliers during the bidding
process? If so, how much? How does the auction format influence the outcome of
the selection procedure in this context?
These questions are particularly relevant given the increased flexibility in auc-
tion formats used in the procurement sector. In many countries the discipline on
public procurement has recently enlarged the range of alternative bidding proce-
dures to include reverse electronic auctions, in which differing amounts of informa-
tion revelation are allowed (see e.g. General Service Administration [15], page 12;
European Directives 2004/18/EC, art. 54). Similarly, in the B2B sector private
procurers adopt a diverse range of practices with respect to the release of informa-
tion regarding their qualitative evaluation (see e.g. Teich et al. [28] and Kostamis
et al. [20].).
Following the existing literature (see the next Section) we model suppliers’
quality as a random variable that is privately known by the procurers, whose bids
are ranked according to a function of both price and quality, the score. In a first
score auction the disclosure of this information directly affects suppliers’ bidding
strategies and consequently it influences the actual outcome of the procedure. We
address three different regimes concerning the dissemination of information: con-
cealment, private revelation and public revelation.1 In the first case, the procurer
maintains absolute secrecy regarding her valuation of the qualitative aspects of the
bids. In the second case, each supplier learns the value assigned to his quality. In
the last case, the procurer publicly reports the scores assigned to the qualitative
aspects of all competitors.
The existing literature has studied this issue assuming identical costs for all
suppliers. We drop such assumption in the present paper. We also explicitly study
the interplay between information regime and auction format. The main conclu-
sions of our model are that i) with a second score auction format the information
regime is irrelevant in the sense that it does not affect the auction’s outcome and
the allocation is surely efficient; ii) the same result can be achieved by means of
a first score auction in association with a public revelation regime; iii) the max-
imization of the procurer’s expected utility requires a first score auction format,
associated with the appropriate information regime, as follows: when the weight
assigned to suppliers’ quality is relatively high with respect to the potential asym-
metry in their costs, then the optimal information regime is private revelation.
In the opposite case the optimal information regime is concealment. A familiar
trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction thus emerges as an outcome of
our model. In the classic literature on multidimensional auctions the existence of
1Apparently, the implementation of a private revelation regime is legally and practically more
problematic. However, it can be interpreted as a case in which the buyer publicly announces her
preferences about the attributes she cares for in determining the merits of suppliers, therefore
overcoming such potential problems.
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this trade-off induces the procurer to underweight quality in the optimal scoring
function. In our model such trade-off drives the buyer to disclose less information
than efficiency would require.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a concise review of
the related literature. Section 3 introduces the general model and the policies
available to the buyer. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium bidding strategies under
different procurement policies. Section 5 compares the respective outcomes from
two different point of view: their allocative efficiency and their convenience for
the buyer. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions and identifies some
potential extensions of this work. All proofs can be found in the mathematical
appendix.
2 Related literature
In view of studying a multidimensional auction procedure in a context in which
the quality of each supplier strictly depends on the subjective requirements of
the buyer, quality in this paper is assumed to be the buyer’s private information.
The traditional literature on multidimensional auctions (e.g. Che [8], Branco [6],
Naegelen [24], Asker and Cantillon [3].) is not adequate to address this issue, its
main focus being on the optimal scoring function given an information setup in
which the quality of each bid is either common knowledge or known at least by
each specific supplier. Typically the optimal scoring function puts less weight on
quality with respect to the true preferences of the buyer.
Rezende [26] extends this optimal mechanism approach by assuming that the
buyer is privately informed about the quality of each supplier, and shows that the
policy regarding the revelation of information is irrelevant when the buyer is able
to commit herself to the adoption of an optimal scoring function. However, from
a practical standpoint, the buyer might not be able to implement such an optimal
mechanism, due to the buyer’s inability to commit to an ex-post inefficient alloca-
tion rule2. As a consequence, and in accord with commonly observed procurement
practices, many authors have assumed that the procurer adopts a “naive” scoring
function, equal to her true utility function (see Gal-Or et al. [14], Kostamis et
al. [20], Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. [11] and Katok and Wambach [17]). This
approach redefines the goal of the analysis as follows: to come up with the optimal
information revelation strategy, given a well defined awarding rule.
2Rezende ([26], section 4) also focuses on this case, but he hypothesises that, in absence
of commitment power, the buyer is unable to credibly commit herself not to renege the price
proposed by the winning bidder. In our analysis we exclude the possibility of a renegotiation
phase and for this reason our results are not comparable.
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The paper of Gal-Or et al. [14] investigates a multidimensional auction ac-
cording to the above approach. Their model displays the main characteristic of
horizontal differentiation, i.e. suppliers cannot be ranked ex-ante objectively ac-
cording to quality, which in turn is not correlated with production costs. They
show that under the hypothesis of risk-neutral suppliers with identical costs pri-
vate and public revelation are equivalent, while concealment is generally the worst
option. Doni and Menicucci [10] extend the analysis of Gal-Or et al. to the case
of risk-averse bidders; they show that in this case the private revelation always
dominates the public revelation, while concealment can be the best option for the
buyer when bidders are sufficiently risk averse.
In the present paper we extend the Gal-Or et al. model along another direction,
namely by allowing for heterogeneity in firms’ costs, as usually hypothesized in
auction theory. However, we assume that suppliers are perfectly informed about
the cost of their competitor. This hypothesis, beside fitting existing real contexts,
makes the model more tractable. Heterogeneous costs also appear in the paper
by Kostamis et al. [20] where they are considered suppliers’ private information.
The main difference between our model and Kostamis et al. [20] is that they
assume that the buyer can choose the information regime after having observed
suppliers’ quality. This hypothesis can be interesting in private procurement while
it is not viable in public procurement because usually regulations force the public
procurer to announce the information regime before the proposals’ submission
takes place. However, their analysis is based on a Bayes-Nash equilibrium that
is not sequentially rational. Indeed they neglect the effect of buyer’s strategy on
suppliers’ beliefs.
The model considered here can be described as a two-stage game: in the first
stage the procurer chooses the procurement policy and in this way selects the
auction game that will be played by the suppliers in the second stage. Six alter-
native policies are possible, involving two auction formats (first score and second
score auctions) and three alternative information regimes (concealment, private
revelation, and public revelation). Each policy can be associated to some existing
model: the Second Score auction resembles the original Vickrey auction. The First
Score-Public Revelation policy represents a game with complete information where
suppliers are characterized by different valuations and compete à la Bertrand. The
First Score-Private Revelation policy makes suppliers compete as in a specific kind
of asymmetric auction, already studied at length e.g. by Maskin and Riley [22].
Finally, the First Score-Concealment policy can be analyzed as a horizontally dif-
ferentiated duopoly where the position of each supplier is exogenously located at
either end of the Hotelling line and the buyer’s position is distributed symmetri-
cally with respect to the centre of the line. The similarity between a first score
auction with concealment and a horizontal differentiated market is also supported
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by the coincidence between the equilibrium bidding strategies identified by Gal-Or
et al. [14] and the price equilibrium of the model of horizontal differentiation put
forward by Perloff and Salop [25].
The issue of information revelation in an horizontally differentiated set-up is
studied by Kaplan [16] where the suppliers’ quality depends both on their privately
known characteristics and on the buyer’s unknown preferences. The paper studies
two scenarios which are close to our concealment and private revelation regimes;
however the results are not fully comparable with ours as he applies his analysis
to a contest, while we consider an auction.
The topic of endogenous information is also analyzed in Ganuza [13]. The au-
thor considers an independent private value auction in which the auctioneer holds
some private information about the characteristics of the object. Such informa-
tion can be revealed more or less precisely, and impacts on the bidders’ awareness
of their own valuation. Without information releasing, bidders’ beliefs are com-
pletely homogeneous, whereas as more information is revealed bidders become
more heterogeneous. The paper’s main result emphasizes the existence of a trade
off between efficiency and rent extraction: the former would require full revelation
while the latter would be obtained without any revelation. So in that model the
optimal policy3 requires that the buyer’s private information be partially revealed.
Although this finding is very close in spirit to our conclusions, there are relevant
differences. In Ganuza [13] bidders must submit a price without knowing with
certainty their valuation, so their ex-post payoff in case of winning is uncertain.
Conversely, in the present model every bidder knows perfectly his cost; conse-
quently, he automatically defines his ex-post profit by choosing a price level. The
uncertainty regarding his quality affects only his probability of winning.
3 The general setup
Consider a unique buyer wishing to purchase a single unit of a specific product by
means of an auction. There are 2 firms competing to supply the item. Both the
buyer and the suppliers are assumed to be risk-neutral.
The two suppliers have different production costs and perfect information both
about their own and their opponent’s cost4. These costs are labelled cw and cs
3Note that also this issue has been analysed from two different point of view: Ganuza [13]
looks for the optimal information policy given a naïve allocation rule, the classic second price
auction. Conversely, Esö and Szentes [12] adopt an optimal mechanism approach; they find
that if the auctioneer can implement the optimal allocation rule, than she should reveal all the
information at her disposal.
4The perfect information assumption, with regard to bidders’ costs, can be found also in the
multidimensional auction model analysed by Burguet and Che [7]. Thank to this similarity, we
will take advantage of some of their results.
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with cw− cs = ∆ ≥ 0, so we have a “weak” supplier and a “strong” supplier (with
subscripts w and s used henceforth in this sense).
The buyer is assumed to value the specific product provided by each seller
differently. Let qi denote the buyer’s evaluation of the quality of the product
supplied by bidder i = w, s. The quality parameters qi are assumed to be generated
by independent and identically distributed random variables whose realizations
are privately known by the buyer. The probability distribution governing the
uncertainty on qualities is assumed to have a continuously differentiable density
function f(q) on the support
£
q, q¯
¤
, where q > 0, and to satisfy the following:
Assumption 1. The density function f is log-concave, i.e. f
0
f is decreasing.
This is a rather common assumption in auction theory (see e.g. Branco [6]).
Besides, as shown in Bagnoli and Bergstrom [5], this property is satisfied by a wide
range of probability distributions and has various interesting consequences.
The utility that the buyer can obtain contracting with a specific supplier de-
pends on the quality of his product and the price asked to provide it:
U(qi, pi) = qi − pi, i = w, s
The buyer will only purchase from suppliers providing non-negative utility5.
The parameter b = q¯ − q > 0 can be interpreted in terms of how much the buyer
cares for quality: indeed it represents the maximum the buyer is willing to pay
for contracting with the highest-quality type rather than with the lowest possible
one.
The score function used to evaluate alternative bids is assumed to coincide with
the buyer’s utility function, that is:
σi = qi − pi, i = w, s
Each supplier selects an economic bid pi in order to maximize his expected
profit, equal to his ex-post profit times the probability of being the selected con-
tractor:
max
pi
(pi − ci) Pr{σi ≥ σj} (1)
The parameter q is constrained to be sufficiently high to guarantee a positive
score for each bidder in equilibrium. This is a standard assumption in the multi-
dimensional auction literature, e.g. Che [8] (Assumption 2, page 671). Implicitly,
5This puts an upper bound on the bid any supplier can make, and so rules out practically
uninteresting equilibria where suppliers place unboundedly high bids with some positive proba-
bility. See, for example, Baye and Morgan [4], who identify equilibria of this type in standard
Bertrand games.
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this imposes a lower bound on the evaluation of q to make sure the score function
remains positive in equilibrium. So the analysis targets the cases in which there is
enough “gain from trade”.
Supplier i0s "valuation" of the contract is defined as the social surplus stemming
from the exchange between the buyer and himself: vi = qi − ci, i = w, s. Remark
that this valuation is equal to the maximum score achievable by a supplier under
the constraint of a non-negative ex-post profit (pi ≥ ci). In the following analysis
vi and v¯i denote the minimum and maximum possible values for the valuation of
supplier i. Notice that the (common) length of the valuations intervals, v¯i − vi,
equals b, whereas the shift between the two intervals, vs − vw, is equal to ∆.
Therefore depending on b and ∆ the possible valuations for the two suppliers lie
in intervals which may or not overlap.
Analyzing the efficiency and the expected utility of the outcomes achievable
by the buyer using different procurement policies is the main goal of the paper.
Specifically, a procurement policy consists of an auction format and an information
regime. The analysis will compare two possible auction formats and three different
information regimes. As a first step, the potential differences arising from the
choice of either a first score (FS) or a second score (SS) auction will be compared.
The winning bidder will be always the one with the highest score: but in the
former case, the price will equal the submitted bid, whereas in the latter the price
will be such as to have the winner match the score achieved by the non-winning
supplier (in other words if i wins, i.e. σi > σj, i will be rewarded a price equal to
qi − σj).
We want to compare different information regimes that the buyer can adopt
with respect to the revelation of her valuation of the suppliers’ qualities. The
buyer chooses how much information (if any) to disclose. Practically, she has to
choose one of the following information regimes:
a) Concealment (C ): no information is revealed, and consequently each
supplier must decide the price to submit knowing nothing about the buyer’s rating
of their product;
b) Private Revelation (Pr): each supplier is informed about the quality
rating received by his product, but not that received by his opponent;
c) Public Revelation (Pu): the buyer announces publicly the quality rating
of each supplier’s product.
To recap, the timing of the model is as follows:
1) the buyer announces a procurement policy, specifying the auction format
and the information regime;
2) Nature chooses qualities;
3) the buyer observes the quality of each seller and then she sends a message
to everyone according to the chosen information regime;
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4) each supplier receives the buyer’s message and selects his bid strategy;
5) the auction runs, the winning bidder is selected, and buyer and sellers
receive their payoffs.
4 Suppliers’ bidding strategies under different
procurement policies
This Section derives the equilibrium bidding strategies for suppliers under each of
the alternative procurement policies.
4.1 Second score (SS) auction
In SS auctions suppliers’ strategies are determined as in standard second price
auctions. Restricting attention to equilibria in weakly dominant strategies6 implies
there is a unique Nash equilibrium and the final allocation is independent of the
information regime adopted by the buyer7. The standard Vickrey argument allows
to characterize the equilibrium strategies and the outcome of the auction as follows:
SS.i) both suppliers bid their marginal cost: pSSi (ci) = ci;
SS.ii) bidder i wins if and only if vi > vj;
SS.iii) in equilibrium, the buyer’s utility equals the losing bidder’s valua-
tion.
Observe that, with regard to SS.ii), given our assumption on the distribution
of qualities, the situation where the bidders’ valuations are equal can be ignored
as it occurs with zero probability.
4.2 First score (FS) auction
This Section shows that the information regime is relevant when the buyer adopts
an FS rather than an SS auction.
6Note that in our context the revelation policy can affect the suppliers’ knowledge about the
procurer’s assessment of their quality. This fact could make the suppliers aware of the ranking
of their valuation. In such case there is a continuum of weakly-dominated equilibria, admitting
both efficient and inefficient outcomes (see Kim and Che [18] for the exact description of such
equilibria).
7This result may not hold if the procurer adopts a dynamic reverse auction for the submission
of the price bid. Katok and Wambach [17] show both theoretically and experimentally that dif-
ferent disclosure policies can significantly affect the outcome of the procurement procedure. How-
ever, the second score auction and the multidimensional English auction are outcome-equivalent
if every bidder must be always informed of his rank during the dynamic phase, as required by
the EU legislation.
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4.2.1 Public Revelation (Pu).
In this case the suppliers are publicly informed about their quality and their com-
petitor’s, prior to submitting their price offers. Given that suppliers also know the
production costs, it follows that they are perfectly informed about the valuation of
both competitors. As a consequence, the supplier with the highest valuation has a
direct bidding advantage over his competitor as in standard Bertrand games with
asymmetric players. Thus, in any pure-strategy equilibrium, the winning bidder
must be the seller with the highest valuation achieving a score equal to the valua-
tion of his opponent, while the losing bidder must be unable to increase his score
any higher and so must be bidding his marginal cost . To avoid problems with
regard to the existence of an equilibrium in the presence of perfect information,
it is assumed that ties are broken by means of a SS auction (which boils down
to awarding the contract to the supplier with the highest valuation). This obser-
vation provides the intuition to characterize the unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies of the FS auction with Public Revelation (Pu)8:
Pu.i) bidder i wins if and only if vi > vj;
Pu.ii) the winning supplier (i) bids and receives price pPui = qi − qj + cj
(which implies that σi = vj);
Pu.iii) the losing supplier (j) bids a price equal to his own marginal cost,
pPuj = cj.
Notice that the equilibrium outcome of the Pu policy corresponds to that of
the SS policy, so the two are outcome-equivalent. For this reason, henceforth the
Pu and SS auctions will be jointly referred to as the SS-Pu policy.
4.2.2 Private Revelation (Pr)
It is shown here that this selection procedure is equivalent to an asymmetric auc-
tion. Indeed each supplier chooses his bid by solving maxpi(pi − ci) Pr{σi ≥ σj}
or equivalently
max
σi
(vi − σi) Pr{σi ≥ σj}.
Now, the Pr policy means each bidder is privately informed on his own valua-
tion, while it is common knowledge that suppliers’ valuations are drawn from the
distributions
Fs :
£
q − cs, q¯ − cs
¤
→ [0, 1] , Fs (x) = F (x+ cs)
Fw :
£
q − cw, q¯ − cw
¤
→ [0, 1] , Fw (x) = F (x+ cw)
8A formal proof can be found Burguet and Che [7], where the existence of a continuum of
payoff-equivalent equilibria in which the winning bidder does as in Pu.ii) and the losing bidder
mixes between bidding his cost and bidding his cost plus a positive (sufficiently small) constant
is also shown.
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given the probability distribution F which determines the qualities. This means we
have an asymmetric auction where bidders’ distributions are identical except for
a shift, whose size is equal to the cost difference between the two suppliers. This
setup boils down to bidders choosing a score given a privately known valuation.
Applying the results achieved by Maskin and Riley [22] (Proposition 3.5.ii), in a
FS auction with Pr the equilibrium bidding strategies can be shown to satisfy the
following property:
Pr.i) vs(σ) > vw(σ), ∀σ ∈ (σ∗, σ∗), where vs(·) and vw(·) are the inverse
bidding functions of the strong and the weak bidder, while σ∗ and σ∗ are the lowest
and the highest winning bids in equilibrium.
The interpretation is that, in equilibrium, bidders obtain the same score only
if the strong has a higher valuation than the weak’s. In practice, the two adopt
asymmetric bidding functions whereby the weak supplier bids more aggressively
than the strong, requiring a smaller mark-up with respect to his cost.
4.2.3 Concealment (C)
When the buyer releases no information about qualities, each supplier chooses
his price strategy knowing only the production costs. Therefore, the suppliers’
problem reported in (1) can be rewritten as follows:
max
ps
(ps − cs) Pr{z ≤ pw − ps} (2)
max
pw
(pw − cw) Pr{z ≥ pw − ps} (3)
where z = qw − qs. Suppliers share common beliefs with regard to the possible
difference between their qualities. The density of the random variable z, h (z), can
be obtained by the convolution of f (q), the density generating q, and of its mirror
image f (−q). Formally:
h (z) =
( R q¯+z
q f (q − z) f (q) dq if z ∈ [−b, 0]R q¯
q+z f (q − z) f (q) dq if z ∈ (0, b]
This problem is similar to a generalization of the Hotelling model, as shown in
Section 5. Some interesting properties of the random variable z can be easily
derived as summarized in Lemma 9 in the Appendix. In particular, its density
turns out to be log-concave. The first order conditions of problems (2) and (3) and
this property (which ensures second order conditions for (2) and (3) are satisfied),
yield the following equilibrium bidding strategies:
ps = cs +
H (z∗)
h (z∗)
, pw = cw +
1−H (z∗)
h (z∗)
(4)
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where z∗ is the solution to the following implicit equation:
z∗ = ∆+
1− 2H (z∗)
h (z∗)
(5)
Notice that z∗ corresponds to the difference between qualities such that the auction
ends up with an exact tie. We can now state the following Proposition9.
Proposition 2. The following properties hold.
C.i) z∗ (∆) is a strictly increasing bijection from [0,+∞) to [0, b);
C.ii) in equilibrium, ∆ > 0⇒ pw > ps and 0 < pw − cw < ps − cs.
Thus under the C policy the strong supplier always asks for a lower price than
the weak supplier — but not as much as to win the auction with certainty (because
z∗ is always less than b). Note that in equilibrium both suppliers bid a price strictly
higher than their costs and, as a consequence, both try to obtain an extra-profit
i.e. to gain a rent. Such rent is smaller for the weak supplier, who is therefore
more aggressive than the strong, which makes this situation similar to a standard
asymmetric auction (see Section 4.2.2). For example, under uniformly distributed
qualities, the nature of these rents can be clarified by inspecting the suppliers’
bidding strategies:
pCs = cs +
5 (∆− b)
8
+
3
q
(∆− b)2 + 8b
8
pCw = cw −
∆− b
8
+
q
(∆− b)2 + 8b
8
In general, it is instructive to consider two extreme cases: if b = 0, then the
weak supplier bids a price equal to his cost and his opponent will win with certainty
earning a rent equal to his cost advantage, ∆. This is the classic informative rent
for the most efficient bidder in a Bertrand game with cost-asymmetric and quality-
homogeneous suppliers. If ∆ = 0 then both suppliers bid a price equal to their
costs plus a rent equal to 1
2h(0) (if qualities are uniformly distributed this equals
b
2
) and each of them will win with a 50% chance. In this case both suppliers earn
a positive expected rent in equilibrium, due to the importance the buyer assigns
to (quality-induced) product differentiation. For this reason we can define it as
Hotelling rent. When both b and ∆ are strictly positive, the weak supplier will
gain only an expected rent due to the Hotelling effect, while his opponent will get
a composition of the two distinct rents.
9An equivalent result appears within a different setting in Anderson and Renault [2].
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5 A comparative evaluation of different procure-
ment policies
This Section compares the procurement policies from two different points of view.
To begin with, the efficiency of each mechanism is evaluated. A mechanism is
defined efficient if it always maximizes the social surplus created by the exchange,
i.e. if the highest valuation supplier is selected with certainty.
Proposition 3. For the procurement auction defined in Section 3 the following
properties hold:
1) Under the SS-Pu policy the mechanism is always efficient, whatever the value
of b and ∆.
2) Under the Pr policy the mechanism is efficient if and only if either ∆ = 0 or
∆− b ≥ 1f(q¯) .
3) Under the C policy the mechanism is efficient if and only if ∆ = 0.
The above Proposition characterizes the allocative properties of the equilibrium
under the various mechanisms. One implication is that the bidders’ strategies
under heterogeneous costs can induce an inefficient allocation. In particular, if the
buyer adopts the FS auction format, the efficiency of the mechanism is achievable
only fully revealing the buyer’s information. The other regimes, providing only a
partial revelation, may generate inefficient outcomes unless suppliers have identical
costs (Pr and C policies) or the cost difference is high enough (Pr policy). Notice
that with the Pr policy efficiency with heterogeneous costs is linked to the so
called "Getty Effect" (see Maskin and Riley [22]), after the known art museum
icon of the case in which the strong buyer is so strong that his bid beats the weak
buyer for sure: remarkably, this never happens under C. Overall, Proposition 3
shows that the fact that efficiency holds whatever the information regime, which
is true in the Gal-Or et al. [14] setup, is not robust to the introduction of a minor
heterogeneity in the production costs of suppliers.
It is in principle also possible to see the amount of efficiency loss associated
to the Pr and C policies for the intermediate values of ∆ for which both are
inefficient. We have done this exercise numerically assuming uniformly distributed
qualities and the results can be seen in Figure 1. Remark that the ranking among
the three policies according to efficiency is such that Pu is better than Pr which
is better than C.
INSERT FIGURE 0 ABOUT HERE
A related but different type of comparison can be done by evaluating each
procurement policy from the standpoint of the buyer’s expected utility. Since
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the suppliers’ qualities are uncertain ex-ante, the buyer needs choosing the policy
resorting to the expected utility generated by each different mechanism on the
basis of the probability distribution of qualities.
We start calculating the buyer’s expected utility in the case of the C and the
SS-Pu policies by taking advantage of the similarities between our auction model
and a properly defined Hotelling setup. Consider two suppliers exogenously located
at the ends of a Hotelling line and a buyer located at a point z ∈ [−b, b]. Let ds (dw)
denote the distance separating the buyer from the strong (weak) supplier, assumed
to be located in−b (b), so ds = b+z and dw = b−z. Given the price proposed by the
suppliers, ps and pw, the buyer will purchase from the supplier which maximizes his
utility function UH corresponding to the Hotelling score σHi = k−pi− di2 , i = s, w
(where k is a constant).
Lemma 4. The First Score auction and the Hotelling model are strategically and
payoff equivalent provided that:
i) z = qw − qs
ii) k = qe + b
2
Note however that there is a difference between the (interpretation of the) two
models. Indeed, in our case z does not represent the distribution of consumers’
types, but rather the beliefs regarding the type of the unique existing buyer, which
can be thought of as a specific value assigned to the difference between the two
competitors.
The C regime is equivalent to a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which
the suppliers’ strategies depend on their beliefs about the buyer’s position to the
set of feasible proposed prices. On the other hand, the SS-Pu regime corresponds
to the case in which suppliers strategies are mappings from the set of possible
buyer’s position to feasible prices. The following Lemma works out the expected
utility of the buyer under the two different policies.
Lemma 5. The buyer’s expected utility is:
EUSS−Pu = qe − cw +min {b,∆}−
Z min{b,∆}
−b
H (z) dz (6)
EUC = qe − cw −
1−H (z∗)
h (z∗)
+
Z z∗
−b
H (z) dz (7)
Formula (6) corresponds to the expected value of the second highest valuation:
indeed this holds in a SS auction context, where the payoff accruing the auctioneer
equals the second highest valuation.
For what concerns the Pr policy, the calculation of the buyer’s expected utility
is more complex. However, we can take advantage of the coincidence between
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the Pr regime and an asymmetric auction in order to exploit some general results
shown by Maskin and Riley [22], and consider the limiting cases of ∆ = 0 and
large ∆ (with respect to b) to state the following Proposition.
Proposition 6. The ranking among policies, from the point of view of the auc-
tioneer, satisfies the following properties.
1) If ∆ = 0 then Pr ∼ SS − Pu Â C provided that f is monotone.
2) For large enough ∆, C Â Pr Â SS − Pu.
3) For all ∆ > 0, Pr Â SS − Pu provided that F is convex.
This Proposition suggests that, when heterogeneous costs are introduced there
is not a dominant procurement policy for any value of the cost difference. To get
an intuition as to why C becomes the most attractive regime for the buyer when
the cost difference is high enough, consider the rationale of releasing information
to the suppliers: it is a way of inducing more competition by "suggesting" the
weak supplier can win as well. But this is precisely what becomes (almost) not
viable past a threshold for ∆ (because the strong wins almost surely): in that case
passing information to the suppliers (as it happens in Pr and SS-Pu) can only
harm the buyer.
Moreover, as it can be shown, the buyer’s expected utility is linearly homoge-
neous in ∆ and b: in other word doubling both the cost difference and the size of
the quality support doubles the expected utility of the procurer in each informa-
tion regime, without altering the ranking among such different regimes. So, what
really plays a key role in determining the respective positions of the information
regimes is the relative importance of the two sources of heterogeneity of our model,
namely cost and quality differences. Another implication is that, for intermediate
values of ∆, the global ranking depends on the specific probability distribution of
the qualities: while Pr always dominates SS-Pu, Proposition 6 leaves their relative
position with respect to C indeterminate.
We present some numerical results (for a number of different density functions)
to illustrate some regularities in the ranking of the information regimes from the
buyer’s expected utility perspective.
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
Figures 2 and 3 show how under the different regimes10 the buyer’s expected
utility (gross of the weak supplier’s cost11) varies as a function of the cost differ-
ence, assuming the normalization b = 1. What emerges quite clearly is that, for
10For what concerns the regimes C and SS-Pu, we applied (6) and (7). With regard to the Pr
regime, we computed the buyer’s expected utility by means of the BIDCOMP2 software (see Li
and Riley [21]).
11The rationale for this is that a given value for ∆ may result from different combinations of cs
and cw. This potential source of ambiguity is ruled out by adding cw to buyer’s expected utility.
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positive but not too large values of ∆, which information regime (between C and
Pr) dominates depends on the specific probability distribution of the qualities.
In all the numerical estimates we carried out for various choices of distributions
(only part of which are shown in Figures 1 and 2) we observe that the expected
utilities as functions of ∆ cross once and only once. Furthermore, comparing the
buyers’s expected utility plots of two monotone and symmetric distributions, the
crossing point in the decreasing case lies to the right with respect to that of the
increasing case. Our simulations suggest that such properties may have some kind
of generality, and perhaps proving it calls for future research endeavour. Finally,
the distance between Pr and C stems from two different aspects of the density
distribution: for low values of ∆ the distance between Pr and C increases with
the variance. For higher values of ∆ such distance increases with the mean of the
distribution (both these facts are a by-product of the analytical characterization
about the pairwise differences in the buyer’s expected utility shown in the proof
of Proposition 6).
6 More than two sellers
Let us now consider the case of procurement auctions where more than two sellers
are competing to supply the item to the buyer. In what follows we will refer to
the previous setup of Section 3 adapted with the following changes/integrations:
• there are n sellers, with costs equal to c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn;
• ∆j = cj+1 − cj;
• fk,n (q) is the probability density function of the kth largest quality among n
sellers.
We first address the problem of evaluating the allocative efficiency of different
procurement mechanisms.
Proposition 7. For the procurement auction with n suppliers the following prop-
erties hold:
1) Under the SS-Pu policy the mechanism is always efficient.
2) Under the Pr policy the mechanism is efficient if and only if either (i) ∆i =
0, i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and ∆k > b for some k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} or (ii) ∆1 − b ≥ 1f1,k(q¯)
where k = # {j : cj = c2}.
3) Under the C policy the mechanism is efficient if either (i) ∆i = 0,∀i or (ii) ∆i =
0, i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and ∆k > b
µ
1 + 1
k
? q¯
q f2,k(q)f(q)dq
¶
for some k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}
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From the standpoint of the buyer’s expected utility the following holds.
Proposition 8. The ranking among policies, from the point of view of the auc-
tioneer, satisfies the following properties.
1) If ∆i = 0,∀i then Pr ∼ SS − Pu Â C provided that f is increasing.
2) For large enough ∆1, C Â Pr Â SS − Pu.
3) If ∆1 > 0 and ∆i = 0,∀i > 1 then Pr Â SS−Pu provided that f is increasing.12
Summing up, SS-Pu retains its efficiency property, while the other regimes
guarantee efficient outcomes only for quite special configurations of cost differences.
Concerning the buyer’s expected utility discussed in Proposition 6 the ranking
Pr ∼ SS−Pu Â C is robust to the introduction of multiple homogeneous suppliers
provided that f is increasing, while the ranking C Â Pr Â SS − Pu continues
to hold if there is a large enough difference between the strong supplier and its
competitors.
7 Conclusion
In many procurement settings, a supplier’s perceived quality can depend on (or
be defined by) the buyer’s subjective requirements or tastes. In these cases buyers
have to choose what kind of information to provide the suppliers before their
submission of the economic bid. In this paper we have adopted a multidimensional
auction model with horizontally differentiated suppliers in order to analyze the
outcomes generated by different information regimes: concealment, private and
public revelation. Gal-Or et al. [14] show that, in the case of suppliers with
identical costs, all three procurement policies guarantee an efficient allocation of
the contract. Besides, private and public revelation are equivalent from the buyer’s
expected utility standpoint, whereas concealment is generally inferior.
In our setting there are in effect two independent sources of suppliers’ hetero-
geneity: cost structure and quality of the output, as perceived by the procurer.
Under the assumption that production costs are perfectly known to the suppliers
(whose number we limit to two), but unknown to the buyer, our main findings are
as follows:
i) an efficient mechanism requires public revelation of the suppliers’ quality;
concealing or privately revealing such information can lead to inefficient al-
locations when the cost difference between suppliers is strictly positive;
ii) private and public revelation fail to be equivalent when suppliers’ costs are
heterogeneous; private revelation induces an asymmetric auction and in-
creases the buyer’s expected utility with respect to public revelation;
12Kirkegaard [19] also shows that 3) can be extended to slightly more general situations.
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iii) private and public revelation are preferable to concealment for sufficiently
low values of the ratio between the suppliers’ cost difference and the weight
assigned to quality considerations. However, for sufficiently large values of
this ratio, concealment becomes the best strategy.
The interplay between different dimensions of heterogeneity is fundamental in
shaping the relative desirability of the three information regimes, from the view-
point of the procurer’s expected utility from the auction. Our results support the
choice of a concealment regime when one of the firms is known to have large cost
advantages with respect to the competitors. Observe that, if the buyer is uncer-
tain about the cost difference, the optimal information regime depends on buyer’s
beliefs regarding such costs. Whenever such cost differences are (or are believed to
be) comparatively less important our model suggests the private revelation policy.
Publicly revealing the information about the qualities is socially efficient but it is
never in the best interest of the buyer.
The paper also shows that the outcome associated to the public revelation is
coincident with the one achievable with a second score auction, whatever the infor-
mation regime. Therefore, a corollary of our conclusions is that in this framework
first and second score mechanisms are not always equivalent.
Some of the assumptions upon which this work is built may be generalized
further. For this reason we think that future research should extend our analysis
along various directions. A first extension would be to allow for an endogenous
number of bidders: in such case, the degree of competition in the auction could be
influenced by the information regime and so the resulting ranking of alternative
policies could change. A further extension could consider vertically differentiated
suppliers. In many situations the quality of two different goods/suppliers can
in fact be objectively ranked and in such case the uncertainty solely regards the
buyer’s willingness to pay for purchasing the higher quality product instead of the
lower quality one. Future research should then investigate how different procure-
ment policies affect not only the buyer’s expected utility, but also the incentives
to invest in product quality when suppliers can choose to vertically differentiate
their products.
Finally, procurement policies evaluation should keep into account their vulnera-
bility to phenomena of corruption and collusion. Therefore, analyzing the pros and
cons of these different procurement policies when either qualitative evaluations are
expressed by agents of public administration who can pursue their private inter-
est, or when bidders can create a cartel, should also be part of the future research
agenda.
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Appendix
Lemma 9. Let z be the difference between two independent random variables whose
common density is a log-concave function f (q). Then the following properties hold:
• Its density function h (z) is log-concave.
• z has monotone increasing hazard rate and monotone decreasing reverse haz-
ard rate, i.e.:
d
dz
µ
h (z)
1−H (z)
¶
≥ 0 (8)
d
dz
µ
h (z)
H (z)
¶
≤ 0 (9)
• h (z) is symmetric and therefore H(0) = 1
2
.
Proof. Notice first that from the log-concavity assumption on f (q) trivially follows
that f (−q) is also log-concave. Hence h (z) is log-concave, due to the fact that this
property preserves under convolution, and so is the distributionH (z), because log-
concavity of a density function implies log-concavity of its cumulative distribution
function (see An [1] and Bagnoli and Bergstrom [5]). This property implies z
has monotone increasing hazard rate and monotone decreasing reverse hazard rate
(see An [1]). Finally, it is straightforward that h (z) is symmetric and therefore
H(0) = 1
2
.
Proposition (2, page 11). The following properties hold.
C.i) z∗ (∆) is a strictly increasing bijection from [0,+∞) to [0, b);
C.ii) in equilibrium, ∆ > 0⇒ pw > ps and 0 < pw − cw < ps − cs.
Proof. C.i) Notice that, applying the Implicit Function theorem to equation
(5), we get dz
∗(∆)
d∆ =
³
∂
∂z∗
³
z∗ − 1−2H(z∗)h(z∗)
´´−1
=³
1− ∂∂z∗
³
1−H(z∗)
h(z∗)
´
+ ∂∂z∗
³
H(z∗)
h(z∗)
´´−1
> 0 due to (8) and (9), which shows that
z∗ (∆) is strictly increasing. This and the fact that H (0) = 1
2
imply that equa-
tion (5) is satisfied for ∆ = 0 if and only if z∗ = 0. Further, given that the
inverse function ∆ (z∗) = z∗ − 1−2H(z∗)h(z∗) is also monotone increasing and that
limz∗→b∆ (z∗) = +∞, we conclude that z∗ (∆) is a bijection from [0,+∞) to
[0, b) .
C.ii) If ∆ > 0 then pw − ps = ∆ + 1−2H(z
∗)
h(z∗) = z
∗ > 0 in equilibrium (due to
C.i). Further pw − cw − ps + cs = 1−2H(z
∗)
h(z∗) =
1−H(z∗)
h(z∗) −
H(z∗)
h(z∗) ≤ 0 due to (9), (8)
and the fact that z∗ > 0 in equilibrium.
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Proposition (3, page 12). For the procurement auction defined in Section 3 the
following properties hold:
1) Under the SS-Pu policy the mechanism is always efficient, whatever the value
of b and ∆.
2) Under the Pr policy the mechanism is efficient if and only if either ∆ = 0 or
∆− b ≥ 1f(q¯) .
3) Under the C policy the mechanism is efficient if and only if ∆ = 0.
Proof. 1) The result for the SS-Pu case immediately follows from the fact that, as
we remark in Section 4, both these procurement policies imply the selection of the
supplier with the highest contract valuation.
2) The setup with a FS payment rule and a Pr regime when ∆ = 0 reduces to
a symmetric Independent Private Values auction and therefore is efficient. When
∆ > 0 the auction is asymmetric. To analyze this case, assume first that the
weak supplier bids his own valuation. Then the strong supplier’s expected utility
is πEs (ss) = (vs − ss)Fw (ss) to be maximized with respect to the score ss, where
vs is his valuation and Fw (v) = F (v + cw) = F (q) is the distribution function of
the weak bidder valuation. The objective function has derivative
d
dss
πEs (ss) = (vs − ss) fw (ss)− Fw (ss)
Under the assumption ∆− b ≥ 1f(q¯) the optimal score turns out to be v¯w. Indeed
observe that if ss > v¯w = q¯−cw then ddssπ
E
s (ss) = −1 which means that the strong
supplier has no incentive to bid higher than his competitor’s maximum possible
bid. Also,
vs − v¯w = ∆− b ≥
1
f (q¯)
=
Fw (v¯w)
fw (v¯w)
⇒
vs ≥ vs ≥ v¯w +
Fw (v¯w)
fw (v¯w)
≥ x+ Fw (x)
fw (x)
⇒
(vs − x) fw (x)− Fw (x) ≥ 0
whenever x < v¯w thanks to the logconcavity of F .13 So s∗s = v¯w. In turn, as the
strong bidder wins with certainty, bidding his own valuation is a best response
strategy for the weak bidder. Finally Maskin and Riley ([23], Proposition 1) prove
that this equilibrium is, in essence, unique.
13Indeed log-concavity of the density f (which we assume in Assumption 1) implies the log-
concavity of the distribution function F (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom [5], Theorem 1). This
implies that x+ Fw(x)fw(x) is increasing.
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Conversely, when 0 < ∆ < b+ 1f(q¯) ,
vs < v¯w +
Fw (v¯w)
fw (v¯w)
⇒ ∃vs ≥ vs :
(vs − v¯w) fw (v¯w)− Fw (v¯w) < 0
so that the strong bidder optimal score can be less than v¯w, thus leaving the weak
bidder with a positive winning probability. Consequently, there is a non-empty
interval of winning bids (s∗, s∗) (see Pr.i) in Section 4.2.2) over which suppliers’
inverse bidding function are both defined and such that vs(s) > vw(s), ∀s ∈
(s∗, s∗). Then, by continuity of the inverse bidding functions, there exists ε > 0
such that vs(s) > vw(s+ ε), or, equivalently, given a couple of valuations vs > vw
for which the bidders’ scores are the same, there is δ > 0 such that vs > vw + δ
and ss (vs) < sw (vw + δ) so the weak bidder wins the auction despite having the
lowest valuation.
3) In Section 4.2.3 we have seen that, under the C regime, the solution of the
equation
z∗ = cw − cs +
1− 2H (z∗)
h (z∗)
where H is the distribution of qw − qs, is such that, in equilibrium, z∗ = pw − ps.
Therefore, when qw − qs > (<)z∗ supplier w(s) wins the auction. Now notice
that efficiency requires that qw − qs > cw − cs when w wins and vice-versa; hence
equilibrium and efficiency conditions coincide if and only if 1−2H(z
∗)
h(z∗) = 0. Due to
property C.i), this equality holds when z∗ = 0 and in turn this is true if and only
if cw − cs = ∆ = 0.
Lemma (4, page 13). The First Score auction and the Hotelling model are strate-
gically and payoff equivalent provided that:
i) z = qw − qs
ii) k = qe + b
2
Proof. We first show that the outcome does not depend on the chosen setup. That
is σHs < σHw if and only if σs < σw. We have:
σHs < σ
H
w ⇔ k − ps −
ds
2
< k − pw −
dw
2
⇔ qs − ps < qw − pw ⇔ σs < σw
As a consequence, the suppliers’ expected profit at any set of prices is identical in
the two models. Indeed, for the strong supplier we have:
EπHs (ps, pw) = (ps − cs)P
©
σHs ≥ σHw
ª
= (ps − cs)P {σs ≥ σw} = Eπs (ps, pw)
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and analogously for the weak supplier. Strategic equivalence follows (as well as
suppliers’ payoff equivalence). We now show that the buyer’s expected utility is
the same in the two setups. Indeed, let z∗ be such that the strong seller wins if
and only if z ≤ z∗. Using i), ii) and the definitions of ds and dw (see page 13), we
can write
EUH = E
¡
σHs | z ≤ z∗
¢
+E
¡
σHw | z > z∗
¢
= E
µ
k − ps −
ds
2
| z ≤ z∗
¶
+E
µ
k − pw −
dw
2
| z > z∗
¶
= E
µ
qe +
b
2
− ps −
b+ qw − qs
2
| qw − qs ≤ z∗
¶
+
E
µ
qe +
b
2
− pw −
b− qw + qs
2
| qw − qs > z∗
¶
= E
µ
qe − qw + qs
2
¶
+E (qs − ps| qw − qs ≤ z∗) +E (qw − pw| qw − qs > z∗)
= E (qs − ps| qw − qs ≤ z∗) +E (qw − pw| qw − qs > z∗) = EU
which concludes our proof.
Lemma (5, page 13). The buyer’s expected utility, as a function of ∆, is:
EUSS−Pu (∆) = qe − cw +min {b,∆}−
Z min{b,∆}
−b
H (z) dz
EUC (∆) = qe − cw −
1−H (z∗)
h (z∗)
+
Z z∗
−b
H (z) dz
Proof. In equilibrium the prices proposed by the winning seller (who will be the
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strong if∆ > z and the weak otherwise) under the SS−Pu regime is pi = cj+qi−qj
EUSS−Pu =
min{b,∆}Z
−b
µ
k − cw + z −
z
2
− b
2
¶
h (z) dz +
bZ
min{b,∆}
µ
k − cs − z +
z
2
− b
2
¶
h (z) dz
=
min{b,∆}Z
−b
µ
k − cw +
z
2
− b
2
¶
h (z) dz +
bZ
min{b,∆}
µ
k − cs −
z
2
− b
2
¶
h (z) dz
=
Z b
−b
µ
k − cw −
b
2
¶
h (z) dz +
min{b,∆}Z
−b
z
2
h (z) dz +
bZ
min{b,∆}
³
∆− z
2
´
h (z) dz
= k − cw −
b
2
+∆
bZ
min{b,∆}
h (z) dz +
Z 0
−b
z
2
h (z) dz +
min{b,∆}Z
0
z
2
h (z) dz −
⎛
⎝
Z b
0
z
2
h (z) dz −
min{b,∆}Z
0
z
2
h (z) dz
⎞
⎠
= k − cw −
b
2
+∆
bZ
min{b,∆}
h (z) dz +
min{b,∆}Z
0
zh (z) dz +
Z 0
−b
z
2
h (z) dz −
Z b
0
z
2
h (z) dz
= k − cw −
b
2
+∆
Z b
min{b,∆}
h (z) dz +
min{b,∆}Z
−b
zh (z) dz
= k − cw −
b
2
+∆ (H (b)−H (min {b,∆})) + min {b,∆}H (min {b,∆}) +
bH (−b)−
min{b,∆}Z
−b
H (z) dz
= qe − cw +min {b,∆}−
min{b,∆}Z
−b
H (z) dz
Let us now turn to EUC (∆). In this case we have ps = cs +
H(z∗)
h(z∗) , pw =
cw +
1−H(z∗)
h(z∗) and the strong (weak) will win if z < z
∗ (z > z∗), where z∗ is such
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that z∗ = ∆+ 1−2H(z
∗)
h(z∗) as obtained in Section 4.2.3.
Therefore:
EUC (∆) =
Z z∗
−b
µ
k − cs −
H (z∗)
h (z∗)
− z
2
− b
2
¶
h (z) dz +Z b
z∗
µ
k − cw −
1−H (z∗)
h (z∗)
+
z
2
− b
2
¶
h (z) dz
=
Z b
−b
µ
k − cw −
b
2
¶
h (z) dz +
Z z∗
−b
µ
∆− H (z
∗)
h (z∗)
− z
2
¶
h (z) dz +Z b
z∗
µ
−1−H (z
∗)
h (z∗)
+
z
2
¶
h (z) dz
= k − cw −
b
2
+
µ
∆− H (z
∗)
h (z∗)
¶Z z∗
−b
h (z) dz − 1−H (z
∗)
h (z∗)
Z b
z∗
h (z) dz +Z z∗
−b
³
−z
2
´
h (z) dz +
Z b
z∗
z
2
h (z) dz
= k − cw −
b
2
+
µ
∆− H (z
∗)
h (z∗)
¶
H (z∗)− 1−H (z
∗)
h (z∗)
(1−H (z∗))−Z 0
−b
z
2
h (z) dz −
Z z∗
0
z
2
h (z) dz +
Z b
0
z
2
h (z) dz −
Z z∗
0
z
2
h (z) dz
= k − cw −
b
2
+H (z∗)
µ
∆− H (z
∗)
h (z∗)
+
1−H (z∗)
h (z∗)
¶
− 1−H (z
∗)
h (z∗)
+
Z b
z∗
zh (z) dz
= k − cw −
b
2
+H (z∗) z∗ − 1−H (z
∗)
h (z∗)
+ b− z∗H (z∗)−
Z b
z∗
H (z) dz
= qe − cw −
1−H (z∗)
h (z∗)
+ b−
Z b
z∗
H (z) dz
= qe − cw −
1−H (z∗)
h (z∗)
+
Z b
−b
H (z) dz −
Z b
z∗
H (z) dz
= qe − cw −
1−H (z∗)
h (z∗)
+
Z z∗
−b
H (z) dz
Proposition (6, page 14). The ranking among policies, from the point of view of
the auctioneer, satisfies the following properties.
1) If ∆ = 0 then Pr ∼ SS − Pu Â C provided that f is monotone.
2) For large enough ∆, C Â Pr Â SS − Pu.
3) For all ∆ > 0, Pr Â SS − Pu provided that F is convex.
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Proof. 1) The above Lemma 5 and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem show that:
EUSS−Pu (∆ = 0) = qe − cw −
Z 0
−b
H (z) dz
EUC (∆ = 0) = qe − cw −
1
2h (0)
+
Z 0
−b
H (z) dz
EUPr (∆ = 0) = EUSS−Pu (∆ = 0) = qe − cw −
Z 0
−b
H (z) dz
We now show that the above formula are indeed equivalent to those found in
Gal-Or et al. [14]. To this purpose suppose cw = 0. Using the fact that14Z 0
−b
H (z) dz =
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz −
Z q¯
q
F 2 (z) dz
14IndeedZ 0
−b
H (z) dz =
Z 0
−b
ÃZ q¯
q
f (x)F (x+ z) dx
!
dz
=
Z 0
−b
F (q¯ + z) dz −
Z q¯
q
µZ 0
−b
F (x) f (x+ z) dz
¶
dx
=
Z 0
−b
F (q¯ + z) dz −
Z q¯
q
F (x)F (x+ z)|0−b dx =
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz −
Z q¯
q
F 2 (z) dz
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we get
EUSS−Pu (∆ = 0) = qe −
Z 0
−b
H (z) dz
= q¯ −
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz −
Z 0
−b
H (z) dz
= q¯ −
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz −
Z 0
−b
ÃZ q¯
q
f (x)F (x+ z) dx
!
dz
= q¯ −
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz −
Z 0
−b
Ã
F (x)F (x+ z)|q¯q −
Z q¯
q
F (x) f (x+ z) dx
!
dz
= q¯ −
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz −
Z 0
−b
F (q¯ + z) dz +
Z q¯
q
µZ 0
−b
F (x) f (x+ z) dz
¶
dx
= q¯ −
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz −
Z 0
−b
F (q¯ + z) dz +
Z q¯
q
F (x)F (x+ z)|0−b dx
= q¯ −
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz −
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz +
Z q¯
q
F 2 (z) dz
= q¯ −
Z q¯
q
F (z) (2− F (z)) dz = E
¡
q(2)
¢
where the last equality stems from the fact that the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the second-order statistic for q is given by F(2) = F (2− F ) and E
¡
q(2)
¢
=R q¯
q zf(2) (z) dz = q¯ −
R q¯
q F (z) (2− F (z)) dz. As for the expected revenue under
concealment we have:
EUC (∆ = 0) = qe − 1
2h (0)
+
Z 0
−b
H (z) dz
= q¯ −
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz − 1
2h (0)
+
Z 0
−b
H (z) dz
= q¯ −
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz − 1
2
R q¯
q f
2 (x) dx
+
Z q¯
q
F (z) dz −
Z q¯
q
F 2 (z) dz
= q¯ − 1
2
R q¯
q f
2 (x) dx
−
Z q¯
q
F 2 (z) dz
= E
¡
q(1)
¢
− 1
2
R q¯
q f
2 (x) dx
where the last equality uses the fact that the cumulative distribution function of
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the first-order statistic for q is given by F(1) = F 2 and E
¡
q(1)
¢
=
R q¯
q zf(1) (z) dz =
q¯−
R q¯
q F
2 (z) dz. The reader can check that these are indeed the formulas of Propo-
sition 3 in Gal-Or et al. [14]. In light of the assumption that f (x) is monotone
the very same Proposition shows that when ∆ = 0 the SS-Pu information regime
(or equivalently the Pr) dominates C in terms of the procurer’s expected revenue.
Indeed Gal-Or et al. [14] actually uses the assumption f 0 (x) ≥ 0. However, if
f 0 (x) ≤ 0 then its mirror image on the support
£
q, q¯
¤
, f
¡
q¯ + q − x
¢
is also log-
concave and increasing and, as shown in Doni and Menicucci [10] (Proposition 1),
it leads to sort the expected revenues in the same order as does f (x).
2) Let us now turn to the case of large ∆. In the Pr format, condition ∆− b ≥
1
f(q¯) ensures efficiency, hence that the strong bidder outbids his competitor offering
q¯ − cw regardless of his quality. This fact, together with formulas in Lemma 5,
allows to determine the ranking for large ∆. Indeed when ∆ is large enough the
difference between EUPr and EUSS−Pu equals q¯ − qe and in turn the difference
between EUC and EUPr approaches qe+ b− q¯ = qe− q. Therefore for large ∆ the
ranking from the point of view of the auctioneer is C Â Pr Â SS − Pu.
3) This directly follows from to Proposition 4.3 of Maskin and Riley [22]: indeed
the Pr policy corresponds to the high-bid auction and the SS -Pu to the open
auction. It can be easily shown that the extra technical requirements of such
Proposition are redundant given that we assume a log-concave density without
probability masses.
Proposition (7, page 15). For the procurement auction with n suppliers the fol-
lowing properties hold:
1) Under the SS-Pu policy the mechanism is always efficient.
2) Under the Pr policy the mechanism is efficient if and only if either (i) ∆i =
0, i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and ∆k > b for some k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} or (ii) ∆1 − b ≥ 1f1,k(q¯)
where k = # {j : cj = c2}.
3) Under the C policy the mechanism is efficient if either (i) ∆i = 0,∀i or (ii) ∆i =
0, i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and ∆k > b
µ
1 + 1
k
? q¯
q f2,k(q)f(q)dq
¶
for some k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}
Proof. 1) This immediately stems from the fact that under complete information
the seller with the highest valuation always wins.
2) The proof is, in its essence, the same as in the n = 2 case with some minimal
caveats as follows.
(i) When more than one seller shares the lowest cost and all the other competitors
have lower valuations with certainty then:
- a strong seller with the lowest possible quality cannot have a positive profit in
equilibrium (because a positive profit is not compatible with his winning proba-
bility being zero in equilibrium);
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- as a consequence of ∆k > b all the non-strong sellers cannot win;
- therefore the competition reduces to the subset of strong players and the outcome
is efficient due to symmetry considerations.
To show that such conditions are necessary we need to study two separate situa-
tions. The case∆1 > 0 is analyzed in (ii). Suppose now that∆i = 0, i = 1, . . . , k−1
and ∆k ≤ b. In this case (some) non-strong bidders can win in equilibrium and
they will bid more than the strong sellers for any given valuation (see e.g. Li and
Riley [21], Prop. 6). Continuity implies that a weak bidder can win the auction
despite there being a strong seller with an higher valuation.
(ii) When there is only one strong seller, condition ∆1−b ≥ 1f1,k(q¯) is necessary and
sufficient to ensure that the strong supplier optimal bid equals his competitors’
maximum possible bid (details are the same as in the case n = 2).
3) (i) In any symmetric equilibrium the n homogeneous sellers will bid equally
and therefore the most efficient seller wins the auction with certainty. (ii) Assume
instead that ∆i = 0, i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and ∆k > b
µ
1 + 1
k
? q¯
q f2,k(q)f(q)dq
¶
for some
k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}. In this case if the strong suppliers bid as if the non-strong are
not in the game, each of them bids p = b
k
? q¯
q f2,k(q)f(q)dq
(see Gal-Or et al. [14], Prop.
1). But doing so, given that ∆k > b
µ
1 + 1
k
? q¯
q f2,k(q)f(q)dq
¶
, will effectively rule
out any chance of winning for the non-strong suppliers. So this is an equilibrium
and it is efficient. Such symmetric equilibrium (i.e. in which the strong play
symmetrically) is also unique: suppose instead that another equilibrium exists
in which the strong play symmetrically; it would be such that some non-strong
sellers have a positive probability of winning (otherwise contradicting uniqueness
in Gal-Or et al. [14], Prop. 1).
Proposition (8, page 16). The ranking among policies, from the point of view of
the auctioneer, satisfies the following properties.
1) If ∆i = 0,∀i then Pr ∼ SS − Pu Â C provided that f is increasing.
2) For large enough ∆1, C Â Pr Â SS − Pu.
3) If ∆1 > 0 and ∆i = 0,∀i > 1 then Pr Â SS−Pu provided that f is increasing.15
Proof. 1) This comes again from the Revenue Equivalence Theorem and the corre-
spondence of our model under homogeneous costs with that of Gal-Or et al. [14].
2) The proof of the fact that Pr Â SS − Pu is the same as for n = 2 (see part 2
of Proposition 6), with the obvious caveat that Proposition 7 needs to be invoked
instead of Proposition 3. Notice that If ∆i = 0, i = 2, . . . , k the size of ∆1 which
ensures the result decreases as a consequence of the fact that f1,k (q¯) increases with
k.We know C Â Pr holds for n = 2. In the C regime, adding more non-strong
15Kirkegaard [19] also shows that 3) can be extended to slightly more general situations.
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suppliers will make those with cost equal c2 more aggressive, which in turn will
make the strong supplier more aggressive as well. As a consequence the buyer’s
expected utility will (weakly) increase, whereas it is unchanged for the Pr regime
(which comes from the above argument whereby in Pr a large enough ∆1 ensures
that the strong will certainly outbid the other suppliers).
3) See Kirkegaard [19], Prop. 12.
References
[1] AN, M.Y. “Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: a Complete Characterization”.
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 50 (1998), pp. 350-369.
[2] ANDERSON, S.P. and RENAULT, R. “Comparative Advertising: Disclosing
Horizontal Match Information”. Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 40 (2009),
pp.558-581.
[3] ASKER, J. and CANTILLON, E. “Procurement when Price and Quality Mat-
ter.” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 41 (2010), pp.1-34.
[4] BAYE, M.R. and MORGAN, J. “A Folk Theorem for One-Shot Bertrand
Games.”, Economics Letters, Vol. 65 (1999), pp. 59-65.
[5] BAGNOLI, M. and BERGSTROM, T. “Log-Concave Probability and its Ap-
plications.” Economic Theory, Vol. 26 (2005), pp. 445-469.
[6] BRANCO, F. “The Design of Multidimensional Auctions.” Rand Journal of
Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), pp. 63-81.
[7] BURGUET, R. and CHE, Y.K. “Competitive Procurement with Corruption.”
Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 35 (2004), pp. 50—68.
[8] CHE, Y.K. “Design Competition through Multidimensional Auction.” Rand
Journal of Economics, Vol. 24 (1993), pp. 668-680.
[9] COLUCCI, D., DONI, N. and VALORI, V. “Information Disclosure in
Procurement Auctions with Horizontally Differentiated Suppliers”. Mimeo
(2011). Available at http://www.dse.unifi.it/upload/sub/WP04_2011.pdf.
[10] DONI, N. and MENICUCCI, D. “A Note on Information Revelation in Pro-
curement Auctions”. Economics Letters, Vol. 108(3) (2010) pp. 307-310.
[11] ENGELBRECHT—WIGGANS, R., HARUVY, E. and KATOK, E. “A Com-
parison of Buyer-Determined and Price-Based Multiattribute Mechanisms.”
Marketing Science, Vol. 26(5) (2007), pp. 629-641.
28
[12] ESÖ, P. and SZENTES, B. “Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and
the Handicap Auction.” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 74 (2007), pp. 705-
731.
[13] GANUZA, J.J. “Ignorance Promotes Competition: an Auction Model with
Endogenous Private Valuations.” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 35 (2004),
pp. 583-598.
[14] GAL-OR, E., GAL-OR, M. and DUKES, A. “Optimal Information Revelation
in Procurement Schemes.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 38 (2007), pp.
400-418.
[15] GENERAL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION, “Re-
verse Auction: User’s Guide.” (2002) Retrieved from
http://www.orbisonline.com/reverse_auction_guide8-29-02.pdf in No-
vember 2010.
[16] KAPLAN, T. “Communication of preferences in contests for contracts.” Eco-
nomic Theory, forthcoming, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0525-2.
[17] KATOK, E. and WAMBACH, A. “Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-
Determined Reverse Auctions.” Mimeo (2008). Retrieved from
http://www.personal.psu.edu/exk106/collusion_post.pdf in November
2010.
[18] KIM, J. and CHE, Y.K. "Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in
Standard Auctions." Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 46(2) (2004), pp.
383-397.
[19] KIRKEGAARD, R. Ranking asymmetric auctions using the disper-
sive order. Mimeo (2011), University of Guelph, Retrieved from
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~rkirkega/Dispersion.pdf in August 2011.
[20] KOSTAMIS, D., BEIL, D.R. and DUENYAS, I., “Total-Cost Procurement
Auctions: Impact of Suppliers’ Cost Adjustments on Auction Format Choice.”
Management Science, Vol. 55 (2009), pp. 1985-1999.
[21] LI, H. and RILEY, J.G. “Auction Choice.” International Journal of Industrial
Organization, Vol. 25(6) (2007), pp. 1269-1298.
[22] MASKIN, E. and RILEY, J.G. “Asymmetric Auctions.” Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. 67 (2000), pp. 413-438.
[23] MASKIN, E. and RILEY, J.G. “Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid
Auctions.” Games and Economic Behaviour, vol.45 (2003), pp. 395-409.
29
[24] NAEGELEN, F. “Implementing Optimal Procurement Auctions with Exoge-
nous Quality.” Review of Economic Design, Vol. 7 (2002), pp. 135-153.
[25] PERLOFF, J. and SALOP, S. “Equilibrium with Product Differentiation.”
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 52 (1985), pp. 107-120.
[26] REZENDE, L. “Biased Procurement Auctions.” Economic Theory, Vol. 38
(2009), pp. 169-185.
[27] SHACHAT, J. and SWARTHOUT, J.T. “Procurement Auctions for Differen-
tiated Goods.”Decision Analysis, vol. 7(1) (2010), pp. 6-22.
[28] TEICH, J.E., WALLENIUS, H., WALLENIUS, J. and KOPPIUS, O.R.
“Emerging Multiple Issue e-Auctions.” European Journal of Operational Re-
search, Vol. 159(1) (2004), pp. 1-16.
30
Figure 1: Loss in social surplus for intermediate values of ∆.
31
Figure 2: Top: uniform - Middle: f (x) = 2 − 2x - Bottom: f (x) = 2x. Notice
the different scales on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 3: Top: f (x) = 4 (1− x)3 - Middle: f (x) = 4x3 - Bottom: truncated
normal (μ = 0.5, σ = 0.25) in [0, 1]. Notice the different scales on the horizontal
axis.
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